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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

UAV 41939

COURT OF APPEALS
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., :
a Utah corporation,
:
Plaintiff/Appellant,:
:
v.
:
SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT
COMPANY,

Court of Appeals No.
890184-CA

:
:

(Supreme Ct. No. 890043)

Defendant/Respondent:

AUTHORITY FOR REVIEW
Section 78-2-2(3)(1) U.C.A.,

1953, as amended in

effective January 1, 1988, confers
Supreme Court over
court of record

the Court of

original appellate jurisdiction".
3 U.C.A., concerning the Court
that it does

Court

decrees of

Appeals does not

judgment.

any
have

An examination of Title 78-2a-

of Appeals1 jurisdiction, reveals

not have jurisdiction over the appeal

concerning the
from

appellate jurisdiction on the

all "orders, judgments, and

over which

1987, and

trial court's dismissal
However, pursuant

dated March 24, 1989, and

of an action

to notice
pursuant to

from

in this case
for relief
the Supreme

Section 78-2-2(4)

U.C.A., 1953, as amended, effective January 1, 1988, and pursuant
to R. Utah S. Ct and R. Utah Ct. App. 4(a),(b), the Supreme Court
transferred this appeal to the Court of Appeals.
////
////
////

-a-

FILED
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

"""

'989

COURT OF APPEALS
The proceedings below involved an action for relief from the
second of two
one

contradictory rulings entered

ruling in favor of

Century 21 by

in a prior

action;

the original trial Judge,

and a second subsequent contradictory ruling in favor of Security
Title entered by a successor Judge on the same
any new or additional evidence.

-b-

facts and without

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., :
a Utah corporation,
:
Plaintiff/Appellant,:
:
v.
:
SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT
COMPANY,

Court of Appeals No.
890184-CA

:

(Supreme Ct. No. 890043)

Defendant/Respondent:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues
Golden

West,

raised
Inc.,

a

by the
Utah

Plaintiff/Appellant, Century
corporation,

(hereinafter

21

called

"Plaintiff" or "Century 21") are as follows:
1.

Whether

a

Successor

District

authority and jurisdiction to reverse
or additional

evidence) the

Court

Judge

has

the

and/or modify (without new

prior written

final ruling

of the

original Trial Judge?
2.

With

respect

to

whether

a Successor Judge

written

final

Judge

ruling of

determined

that

the

immediately

can reverse
his

he is

preceding

and/or modify

predecessor, after
in

agreement

issue,

the prior

the Successor

with, signed,

and

entered the predecessor's ruling?
3.
dismissing

Whether the trial
the

court in this instant

Plaintiff/Appellant's

action

for

case erred in
relief

from

prior judgment wherein Judge Ballif applied the requirements of a
1

Texas federal case dealing with the issue
where no fraud was

of fraud to this case,

committed or alleged by either

party against

the other?
4,

Whether Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

allows Century 21, against
proceed

in

the

whom a final judgment has

alternative

with

either

an

issued, to

appeal,

or

by

independent action

to

independent action?
5.

Whether the

scope of

using an

obtain relief from a judgment, allowed under Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P.,
is

limited

such that

said

procedure

cannot be

used

in this

instant case, contrary to the express language of the Rule?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.
This case

involves a civil

Plaintiff Century 21 for relief from

action (CV 88-416)

by the

the second of two Judgments

entered in a prior civil case #69561 (both in the Fourth District
Court).

The first Judgment in the prior case

favor.

It was in

1986)

drafted

Minute Entry
entered

by

assumed a new

the form of

by the

a Minute Entry

original Trial

Order or Judgment
the

Judge

(dated March 21,
(David Sam).

was read, approved,

Successor Judge,

Federal Judgeship.

from which relief is

was in Plaintiff's

Boyd

signed, and

after Judge

Sam

The second Judgment (the

one

being sought in

Park,

The

the instant action) was

a

reversal of the first Judgment and was made almost one year after
the entry of the first Judgment.

The second Judgment was entered
2

by the Successor Judge, Boyd Park without the presentation of any
new evidence in

the case

Judgment prepared

and resulted from

by Security

opposite and contradictory

Title, the

to the

a proposed
terms

Summary

of which

provisions of the

were

previously

entered first Judgment Ruling (of Judge David Sam).
2.

The Course of Proceeding,
On May 10, 1985, a civil action was filed in the Fourth

District

Court

under

#

69561

Action" or "First Action").
the

The

Defendant there and the

the Plaintiff there.

"Original

Plaintiff here (Century 21) was

After submission

Action

regarding a

Security

Title,

the

Entry

called

Defendant here (Security Title) was

Original

examined all of the

(hereinafter

Summary

original

Trial

of all pleadings in
Judgment Motion
Court, Judge

ruling dated March

the execution of the

filed by

David

evidence and pleadings and drafted

the

Sam,

a Minute

31, 1986 (See Exhibit

" A " ) . Prior to

Minute Entry Ruling in the

Original Action

on Security Title's Summary Judgment Motion, Judge David Sam left
the State Court
Lake.
although

bench and

Judge Sam

never

it had been

Judge was Judge

his own

Judgeship in

Minute

prepared and type-written.

same to be

The successor

it, signed Judge

entered under the

1986 (see Exhibit "A"; Record pp. 37-38).
3

Bench as

After assuming his

successor Judge Park read

Ruling, agreed with

Salt

Entry Ruling,

assumed the State Court

in place of Judge Sam.

new responsibilities, the

and caused the

signed

Boyd Park who

the successor to and

Minute Entry

assumed a Federal

Judge Samfs
Sam's ruling

date of March

31,

The March 31, 1986
and

entered by Judge

ruling prepared by Judge Sam
Security Titlefs

Park denied

Summary Judgment of $5,000.00, against Century 21.
seven (7) months later,

and signed
request for

Approximately

a Summary Judgment document

proposed by

Security Title's attorney, Robert Moody, was presented to counsel
for Century 21 and the Court.
the

proposed

completely
(i.e. it

Summary

Judgment

contradicted
granted a

Century 21!s attorney objected to
document

the Minute

$5,000 Judgment

Entry

because

its

Ruling of

against Century

terms

Judge Sam
21).

The

Court set oral arguments on the objection to the proposed Summary
Judgment

for February 20,

"B"; record pp.

84-87).

1987, before Judge

Park (See Exhibit

A hearing was held on the objections to

the proposed Summary Judgment in the

original action on February

20, 1987, almost one year after the entry of Judge Sam's original
ruling.

THERE WAS

FEBRUARY 20, 1987.

NO NEW
After

Successor Judge Park

EVIDENCE PRESENTED
the February 20,

reversed the

TO THE

COURT ON

1987, hearing,

previously entered ruling

the
of

Judge Sam (which Judge Park had signed and entered for Judge Sam)
and

issued a new Judgment

in favor of Security

for Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00)

Title and against Century 21

(the opposite

result from that which Judge Sam had reached).
There is no
vacating

the

Original

Minute Entry
and

Previously

Security Title's requested relief.
on in

or Order in
Entered

Order

file

denying

There existed from that point

the Original Action two contradictory

of the same Court, one from the original
4

the Court

Judgments or Orders

Trial Judge, based upon

the

evidence

in the

matter

denying relief

to

Security Title

against Century 21, and the second, issued by the Successor Judge
without new evidence,
Title

against

granting the relief requested

Century 21.

entered in the original

The

proposed Summary

action on or about March

the signature of Judge Park (see

Fourth District

4, 1987, under

filed this action

of the two original Judgments

Court (Record pps.

was thereafter filed

Judgment was

Exhibit "C"; Record pp. 90-94).

On March 3, 1988, (within one year) Century 21
for relief from the second

by Security

1-5). An

by Century 21

in the

Amended Complaint

on or about

March 31,

1988

(See Exhibit "F"; Record pp. 6-11).
On or

about April

Motion to Dismiss Century
were filed with the
for

14, 1988,

Security

21fs Complaint.

Briefs

Court by both parties.

Summary Judgment was

Title filed

a

and Memoranda

Thereafter, Motions

filed with the New

Trial Court by the

new Plaintiff Century 21 on or about May 19, 1988.

Again, briefs

were filed with the Court by both parties.
The

Judge in

the

New Action

Century 21fs Summary Judgment Motion
to

Dismiss

decision

were

on or

both submitted
about June 21,

Bailiff issued his

was George

E. Bailiff.

and Security Title's Motion

to

the

1988-.

ruling (see Exhibit

new

Trial Court

On July 19,
lf I!

for

1988, Judge

D ; Record pp.

59-62),

denying the Plaintifffs Motion for

Summary Judgment and granting

the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Thereafter, on or about July

22, 1988, a formal

order was prepared and submitted to the Court

for signature (the date of entry is unknown).
5

On July

28, 1988,

the new Plaintiff Century 21 filed a Motion to Amend the July 19,
1988, ruling of
ruling

so

the Court, seeking to amend

that it

complied with

previous First Action.

the

one sentence of the

underlying facts

Thereafter, an

of the

amended Motion to

Amend

the July 19, 1988, Ruling of the Court was filed by the Plaintiff
on August 29,
Court by
Court's

1988.

both parties with
ruling.

The

Submit its Motion
Court,

Memoranda were thereafter

Judge

regard to

George E.

the

to Amend

the

the Motion

Plaintiff Century

to Amend on or

filed with

21

filed a

about December 19, 1988.

Bailiff,

issued a

ruling

Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion to

Amend the July 19,

under date of January 17, 1989.

This appeal follows.

3,

The

denying the
1988, ruling

The Disposition in the Lower Court.
The Lower

relief

Notice to

from the

entered in the

Court

second of

dismissed
two

first action,

21fs

Century

action

for

contradictory Judgments/Rulings

No. 69561 in

the Fourth

District

Court.
4.

The Statement of the Facts.
UNCONTESTED FACTS

1.

The procedural facts set forth in Section 2, supra, are

incorporated herein as if fully set forth.
2.

The first original action filed by

Security Title as a

Plaintiff was filed under action No. 69561 in the Fourth District
Court on May 10, 1985.
3.

In the

Judgment Motion

First Action,
which resulted

Security Title
in a
6

ruling by

filed a
the then

Summary
Trial

Court Judge David

Sam in favor of

Century 21 (See Exhibit

"A";

Record pp. 37-39)•
4.
with

Part of

Security

Century

Judge Sam's ruling

Title's request

21 in the

for

amount of Five

Judge Sam's original

in the First
relief or

Action dealt

Judgment against

Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00).

ruling denied that relief

(See paragraph 2

of Exhibit "A"; Record p. 38).
5.

A

successor

Judge was

Bench in place of Judge Sam.
6.

The

Park read,

in the first action

Entry dated March 31, 1986.

to the

State Court

The successor Judge was Boyd Park.

successor Judge

Judge Sam's ruling

appointed

approved and

in the form of

entered
a Minute

The Minute Entry had previously been

prepared and type-written by or for or at the direction of
Sam

(See record, pps. 42-43, and See Exhibit " E " ) .
7.

Security Title's attorney waited seven (7) months after

the entry of Judge Sam's ruling
a

Judge

proposed

Summary

leaving the State

(by Judge Park) before preparing

Judgment document

Court bench and

new Judge to reverse Sam's Ruling).
8.

Century 21's attorney

the proposed

Summary Judgment,

Judge Park, set

oral arguments

(knowing

Judge

Sam was

apparently hoping to get

the

(See Exhibit "B".)

of record filed an
after which

objection to

the Court,

regarding the

through

objection to

the

proposed Summary Judgment for February 20, 1987.
9.

A hearing was held on February 20, 1987, at which time,

oral arguments were heard,

but no new evidence was

was any testimony taken.
7

offered, nor

10.

After the February

20, 1987 hearing, (almost

one year

after Judge Sam's ruling had been entered by Judge Park on

March

31, 1986) Judge Park reversed Judge Sam's ruling (which he [Park]
had previously approved, signed and entered) and awarded the Five
Thousand Dollar relief originally requested

by Security Title in

its Summary Judgment in the First Action.
11.

Judge

Sam denied

the $5,000 requested

Century 21 on equitable grounds

relief against

as stated in his March

31, 1986

Ruling (see Paragraph 1 thereof) (see Exhibit "A"; Record pp. 3738) .
12.

The instant action for relief

from judgment was timely

filed (this fact is not disputed).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Judge

David

Sam

was

the

trial

Judge

who,

after

considering the Summary Judgment Motion of Security Title, caused
a typewritten Minute

Entry Ruling, dated

March 31, 1986, to

be

prepared, showing his (Sam's) findings, conclusions and Judgment,
which

denied

Security

against Century 21.
to

signing

assumed

Judge

his own

the State

caused to entered

Title's

requested

relief

Sam left the State Court

ruling.
Court bench,

The successor

Judge

read, agreed with,

of

$5000.00

bench prior
Boyd Park,
signed, and

in the Court record Judge Sam's March 31, 1986

Ruling in favor of Century 21 and against Security Title.
Security Title's Attorney was supposed to draft the Order of
Judgment of

the Court

in

Security Title's attorney

conformity with
waited more

Judge Sam's

than seven months

ruling.
before

preparing said Judgment.

When Security did prepare the Judgment,

it prepared a Judgment document which was opposite and completely
contradictory to Judge Sam's

Ruling with respect to Century

21.

The proposed Summary Judgment granted a $5000.00 Judgment against
Century

21 instead

of denying

that

relied in

accordance with

Judge Sam's Ruling (which denied that requested relief).
3.

Century 211's

Counsel filed a

written objection

to the

proposed Judgment document because it did not reflect Judge Sam's
ruling.

The

successor

arguments

on

Century 21fs

which hearing was
after

the

Park

set a

objection

entry of

that fact

to the

Judge

Sam's ruling.

at the

result

Judge Park

Security Title
from

and

that which

obtained from the

for

oral

proposed Judgment

Judge

No

February 20,
reversed

new

but

Ruling and

a $5000.00 judgment in

against Century
Sam

evidence or

1987 hearing,

Judge Sam's

stated from the bench that he would grant
favor of

hearing

had on February 20, 1987, almost one full year

testimony was presented
despite

Judge

21 (the

had reached).

substantial delay of Security

This

opposite
result

Title's Counsel

in preparing a Judgment Document, in violation of Rule 2.9 of the
Rules of Practice of the District Courts.
4.

Security Title's

attorney proposed a

reflecting Judge Park's decision of February

written Judgment

20, 1987, which new

Order of Judgment was entered in the record of the Court on March
4, 1987, nearly
ruling.
which

No
left

one (1) full year after the entry of Judge Sam's

Order exists vacating
the

Court

record

in

Judge Sam's

earlier ruling,

a

containing

position

two

contradictory rulings, one by the Trial

Judge, and the second, a

contradictory ruling, by the successor Judge in a subsequent term
of the Court.
5.
clearly

All of the

authorities as cited

and unequivocally support

law that a successor Judge may
final

ruling of

the

in the Brief,

the position and

infra,

the rule of

not reverse, remand or modify the

predecessor

Trial

Judge.

Judge

Park's

actions in reversing Judge Sam's ruling under circumstances where
Judge Park

had no new evidence

except for those

and no new testimony

facts which were

before him

before the predecessor

Trial

Judge, was an illegal act and should be declared null and void by
this Court.

The original Judgment of Judge Sam should be allowed

to stand, which Judgment
relief

was in favor

of Century 21 and

denied

to Security Title, in accordance with Judge Sam's written

ruling.
6.

This Summary of Argument

through this paragraph covers

Issues #1 and #2 of the Appeal.
7.

As

to Issue #3 raised on

appeal, Judge Ballif clearly

erred in dismissing

Century 21's

from

two contradictory

the second of

independent action for

first action, which second Judgment was
March 4, 1987.

in the

entered by Judge Park on

Judge Ballifs interpretation of Rule 60 U.R.C.P.

to the effect that
it is couched in
wrong.

Judgments reached

relief

an independent action can be brought
terms of fraud or misrepresentation

The law appears

independent action

to be to the contrary, that

must be

brought rather

than a

only if

is clearly
is, that an
Motion under

Rule

60(b) in the event

of fraud or misrepresentation; however,

an independent

action is

or should be

other

listed in

Rule

reasons

60, including

which exist in the instant case,
were reached in

allowed for

any of

the

the circumstances

where two contradictory rulings
by the Trial Judge

and a

contradictory Judgment reached subsequently by a successor

Judge

in a

the first action, one

successive term of

where the
under

Trial Judge

circumstances

unreasonably in

based upon
where he

check

instrument.
denied
Century

Because of

21.

found

that Security

was a foreign,
out

to be

that finding

by Judge

requested

$5,000.00

Judge

Park,

the

and

Title acted

escrowed funds

fact, turned

Title's
When

particularly true

equitable considerations

check, which

which, in

Security

This is

prematurely disbursing

clearing the deposited
country

the Court.

prior to

out-of-thea fraudulent

Sam, Judge
relief

successor

Sam

against

Judge,

in

a

successive term of the Court, reversed Judge Sam's ruling, he did
so

without

contemplating

and

considering

the

circumstances and findings of Judge Sam which were
with the evidence before Judge Sam.

equitable

in accordance

It is significant that Judge

Park received no new evidence or no new testimony whatsoever, but
reV ersed

Judge Sam's

same evidence
place.
Century

as that

Certainly,
21

in order

ruling and Judgment
which was before
an

independent

to gain

relief

on the same facts
Judge Sam in

action should
from Judge

be

and

the first
allowed

Park's second

Judgment and to obtain a ruling reinstating the first Judgment of

11

Judge

Sam

Action.
8

as the

controlling Judgment

As to Issues #4

in

and #5, they relate to

question whether Century 21 can correctly
independent

action,

Park's decision.

rather

states

that

"any

to this

on their face.

relief"

may

be

Cause oJ

the procedural

proceed with a timely,

than pursuing

With respect

sub-paragraphs are clear

the First

an

appeal

of Judge

issue, Rule 60
The Rule

pursued

by

and its

specifically
means

of

an

independent action.

The use or scope of an independent action is

not

the Rule,

limited

under

U.R.C.P., the language of Rule
to allow the

in

examination of pertinent
to make

accordance

with Rule

60 should be liberally

relief requested by Century

Committee Notes with respect

Rule, seem

and

construed

21 in this case.

to Federal Rule

60, as well as

Utah case rulings with respect

it clear

that Judge

be brought for
is

not

stated by

an

of

reasoning

That is, an independent action can

any of the reasons under Rule 60(b) and its scope

limited to

fraud

Judge Ballif in

urged to read

The

to that

Ballif's dismissal

Century 21fs independent action was error and that the
of Judge Ballif is in error.

1

and misrepresentation
his dismissal

the full Brief

as incorrectly

ruling.

of the Plaintiff

The

in this

Court is
matter,

rather than relying on this sketchy summary of the Argument.

1 O

ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS
ISSUE #1,
WHETHER A SUCCESSOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE HAS THE
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE AND/OR MODIFY (WITHOUT NEW
OR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE) THE PRIOR WRITTEN FINAL RULING OF THE
ORIGINAL TRIAL JUDGE?
1.

The judgment and decision of the Trial Judge, David Sam,

with respect to the
Title in the first

Rule 56 Summary Judgment Motion

of Security

action, was consistent and complied

with the

requirements of Rule 52 U.R.C.P..
2.

Rule 52(b) provides:
Upon motion of a party made not later than
ten days after entry of judgment, the Court
may amend itfs findings or make additional
findings
and
may
amend
the
judgment
accordingly.

3.

There

successor judge

is

no provision

to amend,

in

Rule

reverse, or

52

which allows

modify the findings

a
and

judgment of the original Trial Judge, without a motion of a party
(or possibly where
case, there was
March

31,

no motion filed by

1986, Ruling

successor judge
findings,

new evidence is

of

Judge

was powerless

ruling,

presented).

of

instant

Security Title to amend
David Sam.

to amend,

and judgment

In the

the

Accordingly, a

modify, or

revise the

his predecessor.

(Further

argument and authority on this point is contained below.)
4.

In the Utah case of State v.

1975), our

Utah Supreme

which the trial
record, but

Court dealt

judge stated

Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Ut.
with a

his findings and

fact situation
judgment on

in
the

retired before a final written judgment was entered.
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The successor judge, after the fact, entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law consistent
the trial judge.

with

the findings and judgment of

Our Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:

The final point raised by the defendant is
that the findings of fact and the trial and
proceedings upon which his conviction rests
were incomplete because the judge who tried
the case, Frank Wilkins, did not enter the
findings of fact and conclusions of law, but
this was done by a successor judge..,. As to
the authority of the latter to perform that
duty, Rule 63(a) U.R.C.P., provides: "If by
reason
of
death,
sickness,
or
other
disability a judge before whom an action has
been tried is unable to perform the duties to
be performed by the court under these rules
after a verdict is returned or findings of
fact and conclusions of law are filed, then
any other judge regularly sitting in or
assigned to the court in which the action was
tried may perform those duties. . . .
It is
plainly apparent from the generality of the
phrase, "or other disability" that the rule
is not limited to mere mental or physical
disability, but extends to any disability
whatsoever, including resignation
of the
judge.
Inasmuch as the stated findings and
verdict of Judge Wilkins at the conclusion of
the trial
were sufficient to
meet the
requirements of Rule 52, U.R.C.P., there can
be no
question about the
authority or
propriety of the successor judge to make and
sign formal findings of fact and conclusions
of law
which were consistent
with the
findings and
verdict of the
judge who
actually tried the case. [Emphasis added]
5.

As in the case of

judge in this

case read,

State v. Kelsey, supra, the successor
agreed with, signed,

and entered

findings and ruling of the predecessor trial judge.
the Kelsey case this

was proper and within the

authority of the successor judge.
14

the

According to

jurisdiction and

6.

However,

the successor judge

far beyond his authority
of
the

judge, without

listened to arguments
his

when, almost one year after

the Trial Judge Sam had been
successor

predecessor

and

in the instant case

a

contrary

There is absolutely no dispute

fact that

the original

Judge Park made

additional evidence,

of counsel, and reversed the

judgment.

Judge Sam was

March 31,

prepared by Judge
that clear at

the ruling

entered by the successor judge,
hearing any

entered

and

judgement of
contradictory

in this case as to the

1986 Minute

Entry Ruling

Sam, the original Trial
the February 20, 1987

42 thereof.

THE COURT: Okay we are here this morning on
Security Title and Abstract Company plaintiff
vs. Dick Casper, Et Al, defendants and there
were some cross claims or whatever this is
something that [be]came before Judge Sam.
Judge Sam had actually written the ruling in
this matter but he had not signed it before
he was elevated to the Federal Bench.
I
reviewed the file, reviewed his Judgment and
I
felt
that
it was
fair
under the
circumstances and therefore I adopted his
decision and that is the basis of the ruling
that came out on March 31, 1986. (See copy
of Transcript attached hereto as Exhibit "E";
Record p. 42 - lines 18 through 25, and p.43
- lines 1 and 2.)
THE COURT: I understand what you are saying.
I think this is why Judge Sam did what he
did.
Right.

THE COURT:
And I simply just signed his
Judgment for him since he was gone and he had
already
rendered
it....(See
copy
of
15

Judge.

record on

At that hearing,

in the original action, Judge Park stated as follows:

MR. JEPSON:

of

hearing, a

transcript of which (at least in part) is part of this
appeal, and is found at page

went

held

Transcript attached hereto as Exhibit "E";
Record p. 44 - lines 1 through 8 ) .
7.

The

treatise

authorities

in

the

area

provide the

following persuasive comments:
. . . A court retains its identity regardless
of a
change of its
functionaries, the
judicial powers and duties of a judge, such
as deceased or departing judge, as part of
the court, devolve on his successor, or on
the surviving or remaining judges. This rule
applies to unfinished business or unperformed
duties. . ~.
I It is incumbent upon the
succeeding judge, when a proper motion is
made before him, to enforce a lawful order
made by his predecessor . . . . and it has
been broadly stated that a successor judge
may complete any acts uncompleted by his
predecessor where th e Y do not require the
successor to compare anLd weigh testimony . .
. . An official act manifes ted by the first
judge, but left unfinis hed, may be completed
by his successor, but a court rule to this
effect, applicable in case of disability, may
be invoked only where a complete and final
decision has been rendered by the disabled
judge.
More particularly, the successor
judge may issue rulings on pending motions,
or requests, which do not involve reargument
of earlier rulings, . . . . (See 48A C.J.S.
649, 650.)
Furthermore, he (meaning the successor judge)
cannot enter a nunc pro tunc order sentencing
accused in a criminal prosecution based on a
written memorandum of the trial judge in the
absence of a minute entry by him approving
the verdict and
imposing the
sentence.
[Emphasis added.] (See 48 A C.J.S. 652.)
. . . A successor judge cannot correct errors
of law committed by his predecessor
....
He cannot review, modify, reverse, or vacate,
on the merits, on the same facts, the final
orders of his predecessor, . . .
. o r under
the
guise
of
clarification
or
interpretation, especially orders which were
rendered at a past term, and he may not
modify or
reverse findings of
fact or
1 a

conclusions of
Section 68.)
8.

law,

(See

48A

From the above quote, another

clear.

The

judgement or order

C.J.S.

654

point becomes abundantly

contained in Judge Sam's

Minute

Entry dated March 31, 1986, was rendered in the term of the court
held in 1986.

The reversal of

Judge Park, did
held in 1987.

not come until
It is clear

that reversals of
under

the

that judgement by
a subsequent

of

term of the

court

from the treatise authority,

a predecessor

guise

the successor

judge's ruling

clarification

especially not in a subsequent term

or

supra,

cannot be

made

interpretation,

and

of the court.

The terms

of

the court are defined in the Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-3-9 as annual terms or as terms within each calendar year, and
mandate that

the judges

of the

district courts

terms for the subsequent year in
Law

Dictionary,

Revised

shall fix

December of each year.

Fourth

Edition

(1968) at

the

Black's

page

1640

defines the term of the court as follows:
The term of the court is the time prescribed
by law during which it may be in session. . .
A session signifies the time during the term
when the court sits during the transaction of
business . . .
9.
a

It is or should be

successor

judge

cannot

clear from the above citations, that
in a

subsequent

calendar

year

or

subsequent term of the court, reverse, modify, or amend the final
written order of
those

findings of his

findings, or ruling,

predecessor trial judge,

or judgment were

with Rule 52 U.R.C.P..

17

when

made in compliance

10.

In the case of Michel vs. Michel, 297 N.Y.S.,So.2d 250,

at 253, the Supreme Court of New York held, regarding the

powers

authority or jurisdiction of a successor judge, as follows:
The right to have a decision made by the
trial judge who presided over the entire
matter is so basic and fundamental that it is
not waived by the failure of counsel to
object at the time of the hearing.
. . . It was error for one judge to preside
at a hearing on a writ of error coram nobis
and a second judge to make the decision, even
through in the interim the first judge had
retired from office.
11.
District

In the
Court

case of
of

Doane v.

Appeals

District, stated in

of

the

Rapp, 453
State

So.2d 1197,

of

1984, the following regarding

Florida,

the

Third

the authority

of a successor judge:
The order under
review setting aside a
factual judgment entered by a predecessor
judge is vacated because the successor judge
who
granted that
relief did
not have
authority to do so . . . . [emphasis added]
12.

In the

District Court

case of David

v. Goodman,

of Appeal, Division

held regarding the powers

250 P.2d

Two of State

704, the

of California,

and authority of a successor

follows:
A party litigant is entitled to a decision
upon the facts of his case from the judge who
hears the evidence, where the matter is tried
without a jury . . . .
He cannot be
compelled to accept a decision upon other
facts from another judge . . . .
It was held
to be error, in the absence of consent or
waiver, for the second judge to make findings
and decide material issues from the evidence
introduced before the judge who presided over
the first hearing . . . . [ e m p h a s i s added]

judge as

13.

Again, in the case of

Paragon Group, Inc. v. Hoeksema,

574 S.2d 244 at 245, the District Court of Appeal of the STate of
Florida held in 1985

concerning the powers of a

successor judge

as follows:
A successor judge may complete acts left
unfinished by a predecessor, but may not
weigh
the
testimony
heard before
the
predecessor judge . . . .
A successor judge
may not rule
on a party's
motion for
rehearing where the original trial judge has
been assigned to a different division of the
circuit court.
14.

In still another case, McBride v. McBride, 352 S.2d 244

at 245, the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida held
in 1985 concerning the powers of a successor judge as follows
As grounds for reversal, appellant urges that
the
successor
trial judge
was without
jurisdiction or authority to modify the final
order of his predecessor. Generally, in the
absence of mistake or fraud, a successor
judge cannot review, modify or reverse, upon
the merits on the same facts, the final
orders of his predecessor. [Emphasis added]
15.
v.

In still another case, Thompkins Land and Housing, Inc.

White, 431 So.2d, 259 (Fla.

Court of

Appeal of the State

App. 2 Dist. 1983), the District

of California, in

a 1983 decision

held concerning the powers of a successor Judge as follows:
A successor judge may complete acts left
uncompleted by a predecessor but may not
weigh and compare testimony heard before the
other judge. [Emphasis added]
16.

The

bottom line conclusion from the above controlling,

persuasive and secondary

authorities is

may complete tasks and acts left

that a successor

judge

undone by his predecessor trial
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judge so long

as such tasks and

acts are completed in

a manner

which are consistent with and in harmony with the rulings of

the

predecessor.
17.

In the instant case, Judge Park, acting in his capacity
entered Judge Samfs March

as a successor

judge, signed and

1986,

entry

ruling,

of the

evidence and the

minute

determinations

which

clearly

contained

conclusions of

31,
the

law and

judgment reached by Judge Sam in accordance with Rule 52 U.R.C.P.
In completing the tasks of the predecessor, Judge Park was within
his authority and
upon himself

jurisdiction.

to amend

and reverse

approximately one year after
of court and
testimony,

the Judgment

took

of Judge

Sam,

subsequent term

new or additional evidence

or

and clearly without considering the equitable grounds

1987 Summary

trial

when Judge Park

the fact, and in a

without hearing any

of his predecessor's ruling,

should be

However,

Judge Park's entry of the

Judgment document was outside of

declared null and

judge,

decision in the

David

void.

Sam, should

case and

March 4,

his authority and

The original ruling
be

allowed

relief should be

to

of the

stand as

afforded Century

the
21

from the second Judgment entered in the first action.
ISSUE #2.
WITH RESPECT TO THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ISSUE,
WHETHER A SUCCESSOR JUDGE CAN REVERSE AND/OR MODIFY THE PRIOR
WRITTEN FINAL RULING OF HIS PREDECESSOR, AFTER THE SUCCESSOR
JUDGE DETERMINED THAT HE IS IN AGREEMENT WITH, SIGNED, AND
ENTERED THE PREDECESSOR'S RULING?
18.
that

it

This second issue
includes

the fact

is identical to Issue No.
that

on

a

successor

1, except

judge acted

in

agreeing with,

signing, and

prior to making a
time.
the

entering the predecessor's

contradictory ruling at a subsequent

Based upon the authorities
conclusion

which

successor judge

ruling,

clearly

may not

act in

cited herein, supra and infra,
must

be

reached

a manner

reverses the final

ruling and judgment of

judge

and determined the

who weighed

point in

is

that

which contradicts

the
or

the predecessor trial

evidence in

reaching his

conclusion/ruling in the case.
ISSUE #3. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS INSTANT CASE ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S ACTION FOR RELIEF FROM PRIOR
JUDGMENT WHEREIN JUDGE BALLIF APPLIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF A TEXAS
FEDERAL CASE DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF FRAUD TO THIS CASE, WHERE
NO FRAUD WAS COMMITTED OR ALLEGED BY EITHER PARTY AGAINST THE
OTHER?
19.

Judge Bailiff's ruling (see record, pps. 59-62; Exhibit

"D") correctly states the
of the parties in

history of the case and

the positions

the first four paragraphs thereof,

except for

the last sentence beginning on page one of the ruling (page 59 of
the record; page one of Exhibit " D " ) .

The objections referred to

in Judge Balliffs ruling were objections filed by this counsel to
the proposed Summary
first

action.

The objections were not

that ruling was in
that

inaccuracy

statement

of

Judgment prepared by Security Title

the

to Judge Sam's ruling as

favor of Century 21 (my client).
in

Judge
parties'

Ballif's

ruling,

positions

in the

in

this

Judge

Aside from
Ballif's

new action

is

of authority

or

accurate.
20.

Judge

Ballif sidestepped

the issue

jurisdiction on the part of a successor judge to amend or reverse

21

the ruling

of his

predecessor.

Although Judge Ballif

clearly

identifies this as an issue, which has therefore been included in
this appeal, he
issue.
for

does not

answer or state

a resolution to

that

Rather, the Trial Court (Judge Ballif) in this new action

relief from Judgment, ruled

with respect to

Rule 60 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
. . . Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the procedure for obtaining
relief [f]rom a judgment shall be by motion
or by an independent action.
Therefore, the
rule permits the filing of an independent
action.
However, a question arises as to the scope of
using independent actions to obtain relief
from a judgment.
It appears that plaintiff
takes the position that an independent action
may be used to challenge any judgments.
However, Utah case law and federal case law
interpreting Rule 60 seem to indicate that
independent actions may only be used to
challenge certain judgments.
21.

Judge Ballif

goes

on to

failed to state "the equitable
an

independent

requirement

action

is set

Ballif obtained that

for

out in

state that

Century 21

grounds" required for maintaining
relief

the

from

Utah Rule

Judgment.

No

423 F.2d 73 (C.A. Tex. 1970),

Den. 90 S.Ct.

Furthermore,

Century 21 takes

this independent
exception.

trial court (Judge Ballif)

action.

considerations to

With

Century 21 clearly

this position,
showed to

that the original trial judge

22

Cert.

Judge Ballif concluded

that the Plaintiff had not shown any equitable
filing

Judge

case entitled

Bankers Mortg. Co. v. U.S.,

justify

such

60 U.R.C.P..

requirement by examining the

2242 (1970).

has

the

in the

first

action

considered

the

merits

positions and considered all of
and

entered a

Century 21.
Sam's

of the

various

parties'

the equitable arguments involved

ruling denying

relief to Security

From an examination of

Title against

paragraphs 1 and 2

of Judge

March 31, 1986 ruling (see Exhibit " A " ) , it is clear, that

Judge Sam
well as

considered both the
equitable

allowed equity

considerations

to overcome the

legally obtained.

The most

Sam's mind, clear
Title

did

disbursed
before

not

act

funds

in

"at

draft

institutions."

concerning

the

result which may

ruling, was the

a

parties

Defendants

cleared

the drawee

out-of-state

(See paragraph 1,

and

and

have otherwise

fact that

reasonably prudent

issue to

involved

positions as

fundamental consideration in

from his

Bontivia's check

where the

legal arguments and

Security

manner

Bontivia

Judge

when

it

and Casper

bank, particularly
foreign

Exhibit "A" and

financial

Record, page

38.)
22.
to

It is well-established in

act reasonably

or

who acts

Security Title in the manner in
directly to its

claimed loss)

Utah that a person who fails

in a

negligent manner

(as did

which it disbursed funds leading
should not benefit

from its

own

negligence or unreasonable conduct.
23.

When the

ruling a year

successor Judge

after its entry,

consideration all of the
cause

of

action and

Park reversed

Judge Park

Judge Sam's

failed to take

facts and issues involved in

failed

to

examine or

even

into

the first

consider the

equitable arguments which led to Judge Sam's decision and instead
23

looked

only

at the

"holder in

due

course status"

Security Title, and upon that basis, without
any additional facts or
Sam's
Park

decision.
was

This

illegal

claimed by

the presentation of

any new evidence, simply reversed
act on the part

(meaning contrary

Judge

of the predecessor Judge
to

law)(See

Exhibit "E";

Record p.44 lines 4-13).
24.

Therefore,

this Honorable Appellate Court

and rule that the new trial

should find

court (Judge Ballif presiding) erred

in dismissing Century 21fs new action

for relief from the second

of two contradictory rulings entered in the previous action.

ISSUE #4.
WHETHER RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE ALLOWS A PARTY AGAINST WHOM A FINAL JUDGMENT HAS BEEN
ISSUED TO PROCEED IN THE ALTERNATIVE WITH EITHER AN APPEAL, OR BY
INDEPENDENT ACTION?
25.

As specifically found by

the new trial Judge Ballif in

his ruling (see paragraph 4 of Exhibit "D"; Record page 60), Rule
60(b) clearly allows a
to

proceed

in

the

party against whom a Judgment

alternative

with

either a

has issued

motion

or

by

independent action.

The language of the Rule is undeniably clear

and unconditional.

The position taken

action

for

relief from

Judgement may

grounds of fraud or misrepresentation
clear meaning

by Judge Ballif that

of the language

only

grounds

of Rule

for relief

on the

is clearly contrary to the
60 and to

notes published in connection with that Rule.
(7) specified

be pursued

an

from

Rule

the committee
60 has seven

Judgement and

one

(1)

unnumbered ground contained in the second to the last sentence of

Rule 60 (b).

That sentence reads as follows:

The Rule does not limit the power of a court
to entertain an independent action to relieve
a party from a judgment, order or proceeding
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court.
26.
other

There are six

than fraud,

Judgment.

for

(6) other bases
which a

party may

seekk

Rule

relief from

a

Therefore, it is clear from an analysis and reading of

Rule 60(b) that six of

the eight grounds listed therein

reasons other than fraud.
the Trial

contained in the

It

are for

is illogical and insupportable for

Court to take the position

that all relief under Rule

60(b), if pursued by an independent action, must be based on only
two of the eight enumerated grounds set forth in the Rule.
27.

Furthermore, Rule

1(a) U.R.C.P.

states categorically

and

clearly:
They (meaning the Rules of Procedure) shall
be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive
determination of
every action.
[Emphasis or clarification
added]
28.

A further point in support of Century

21* s position is

the last sentence of Rule 60(b) which states:
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
29.
and

The last sentence of Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. states clearly

undeniably that an

independent action may

be pursued based

upon any of the grounds for relief set forth in this
means the

relief can

be based

on any

25

of the eight

Rule.

That

enumerated

grounds

and

is

not limited

to

ground

No.

3

or the

eighth

unnumbered, but enumerated, ground of fraud.
30.

Further, a

from the Advisory

persuasive argument can be made

Committee on Rules annotations

by quoting

published with

Federal Rule 60(b) which Notes state as follows:
When promulgated, the Rules contain a number
of provisions, including those found in Rule
60(b), describing the practice by a motion to
obtain relief from judgments, and these Rules
coupled with the reservation in Rule 60(b) of
the right to entertain a new action to
relieve a
party from a
judgment, were
generally supposed to coverr the field. . . .
If the right to make a motion is lost by the
expiration of the time limits fixed in thee
rules, the only other procedural remedy is by
a new or independent action to set aside a
judgment upon those principles which have
heretofore been applied in such an action.
Where the independent action is resorted to,
the limitations of time are those of laches
or statutes of limitations.
The Committee
has endeavored to ascertain all the remedies
and types of relief heretofore available . .
It endeavored then to amend the Rule to
permit, either by motion or by independent
action, the granting of various kinds of
relief from judgments which were permitted in
the Federal court prior to the adoption of
these rules, and the Amendment concludes with
a provision abolishing the use of Bills of
Review . . ., and requiring the practice to
be by Motion or by independent action.
It
should be noted that Rule 60(b) does not
assume to define substantive lav/ as to the
grounds for vacating judgments, but merely
prescribes the practice in proceedings to
obtain relief.
3.1.
9

The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Shaw v. Pilcher,

Utah 2d.

222, 341

P.2d

949 (Utah

1959), stated

that where

"fraud upon the Court" is the gravamen of a proceeding to relieve
a

party of the

effect of

a judgment,
26

such proceeding

must be

pursued in an independent

action by filing a separate

not by way of motion in the original action.

suit, and

This shows

that an

independent action is mandated and not merely permissibly allowed
in

the case of

fraud.

The collateral

would therefore be that

statement of

an independent action is not

that rule
limited to

the basis of fraud, but may be used for any of the reasons

under

Rule 60 (b).
32.

The case of St. Pierre v.

1982), clearly
action may

stands for

Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah

the proposition

be filed later than three

that an

months after a judgment or

decree has been entered for fraud or duress.
the

further proposition

that the

equitable principles determine
must be

brought, and

does not

independent

The case stands for

doctrine of laches

the time within which
limited the

and other
the action

time period to

one

year, although Century 21 in this case did file its action within
one

year,

in

compliance

interpretation of

with

the Federal

the

generally

Rule 60(b)

held

which does

view

and

state the

time period.
33.

After a

interpreting

fairly thorough review of the

Rule 60 U.R.C.P.,

it is

annotated cases

believed and

upon belief

asserted that there is no case in Utah which mandates the pursuit
of an appeal after a final judgment
pursuit of an independent
Rule does not state
entered must

action for relief from Judgment.

that the party

proceed by

has issued as opposed to the

appeal

against whom a judgment

or by

independent action,

The
has
but

rather states that relief from the Judgment may be pursued either
27

by motion or by an independent action.

An appeal is not mandated

under Rule 60(b).
34.

Therefore, this

Appellate Court is urged to

Century 21 is within its legal rights in

rule that

pursuing relief from an

independent action rather than by pursuing an appeal or by filing
a motion under Rule 60(b).
ISSUE #5. WHETHER THE SCOPE OF USING AN INDEPENDENT ACTION TO
OBTAIN RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT, allowed under rule 60(B) U.R.C.P.,
IS LIMITED SUCH THAT SAID PROCEDURE CANNOT BE USED IN THIS
INSTANT CASE, CONTRACT TO THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE RULE?
35.

The arguments

set forth

under Issue

#4, supra,

are

incorporated under this issue as if fully set forth herein.
36.

There

appears to

limits the scope

be no case

of an independent

authority which

clearly

action under Rule 60(b)

the pursuit of relief from a judgment.

for

Rather, the cases seem to

indicate that in certain instances, an independent action must be
used,

rather than

a

motion in

judgment based upon fraud.
independent

action

to

the

pursuit of

relief

This in no way limits
the

sole

ground

from a

the use of an
of

fraud

or

and arguments

set

misrepresentation.
37.
forth in

Based

upon all

this brief,

of the authorities

supra,

it is

conclusion of this Court that Century
filed an independent

action for

contradictory rulings or

or should

judgments of the Fourth

9fl

reasoned

21 has properly and timely

relief from the

entered in the First Action No. 69561.

be the

second of

two

District Court

SHORT CONCLUSION
The Appellate Court, after considering all of the arguments,
evidence, record, and briefs

of the parties herein, is

urged to

conclude that a successor Judge (Judge Park in this instance) was
acting without authority and beyond the scope of his jurisdiction
in reversing the prior written final ruling of the original Trial
Judge, David

Sam in

the

under Civil No. 69561.
and entry of

first action

parties

The facts are clear as to the formulation

a written statement

Judgment by Judge

involving these

of findings and conclusion

David Sam without

his signature and the

or
fact

that the successor Judge Park simply acted in entering that March
31,

1986

ruling.

Further,

the Court

is urged

conclusion that the

second Trial Court, Judge

erred in dismissing

Century 21fs

from Judgment and should

to

reach the

Ballif presiding,

independent action for

relief

reverse and remand this matter

the Trial Court for entry of a

back to

Judgment in favor of Century 21's

position and against the position urged by Security Title.
Last of

all, this

conclusion that Rule
independent

action

Appellate Court

60, U.R.C.P.
under

is urged

to reach

allows for the

the circumstances

filing of

as

found

the
an

in this

instant case, where two contradictory rulings have been made in a
previous case, one

by the

original trial judge

based upon

the

evidence and the second by a successor Judge without the hearing,
taking,

or

presentation

testimony and upon

of

new

the same facts

Trial Judge made his ruling.

or

additional

evidence

as existed when the

or

original

As part of that determination, this
29

Honorable Court is

urged to find

entry of Judge Sam's

that Judge Park's signing

March 31, 1986

and

Minute Entry Ruling was

an

act for and in behalf of the original predecessor Trial Judge and
was not an independent act of the successor
allow the

successor Judge

would

the case

be

under other

Summary

Judgment Motion

granted

and

Security

the

Title's

to later

Motion

remanded for Entry

modify his

to

own ruling, as

circumstances.

of the Plaintiff

Trial Court's

Judge, such as would

ruling

Dismiss

of Judgment in

In

short, the

Century 21
granting

should

be

should be

the Defendant
reversed

accordance with this

and

Court's

opinion.

lis />
**( ( day of April, 1989.
DATED this

ARkON F. JEPSO
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Century 21
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify

that I

delivered

four (4)

Brief

Appellant, postage

of

true and

caused to be

mailed and/or

accurate copies
prepaid, on

of

this

Hfi4, 1989, to:
Thomas S. Taylor, Esq.
Taylor, Moody & Thorn
2525 North Canyon Road
P.O. Box 1466
Provo, Utah 84603

(
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hand-
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the ^

day of
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In the Fourth Judicial District Court* °
of the State of Utah
In and For Utah County
SECURITY
COMPANY,

TITLE

AND ABSTRACT

MINUTE ENTRY

FUfattff

CASE NUMBER
DICK CASPER, CARLO BONTIV1A AND/
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST I N C . ,

DATED

Dcfc&dint

69,561
March 31, 198-6
Boyd Park JUDGE

This case is befojhe the court on Motions for Summary Judgment
of plaintiff and defendant Casper and is considered pursuant to
Rule 2,8, Rules of Practice of the District Courts.
R U L I N G
Upon review of the memoranda and documents on file, the
court finds the present facts are undisputed.

The issues of law

shall be decided as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is entitled to restitution from defendant Casper

in the amount of $40,000 subject to a set-off in the amount of
damages defendant Casper suffers through his efforts to pay
restitution.

The court notes defendant Casper relied to his

detriment on the propriety of plaintiff's disbursement of escrow
when Casper used the funds to pay various creditors.

Nevertheless,

the court grants plaintiff's request for restitution in order to

PAGE TWO
# 69,561
avoid unjust enrichment of defendant Casper where he has both
retained the ownership of his property and enjoyed use of the
disbursed funds.

However, the court is persuaded plaintiff did

not act in a reasonably prudent manner when it disbursed the funds
at issue to defendants Bontivia and Casper before Bontivia's check
cleared tne drawee bank, particularly where the draft involved
out-of-state and foreign financial institutions.

For this reason,

the court further rules that plaintiff is not entitled to full
protection of the idesnnification clauses contained in Exhibits
2-4 and that its relief is limited to the above-stated restitution
less any damages defendant Casper can prove at hearing.
r

2.

The court recognized plaintiff's holder in due course status

I as to its claim against defendant Century 21 for reimbursement on the
/P $5,000.00 dishonored check tendered to plaintiff as an escrow fee.
/ However, upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances
\ surrounding the failure of escrow to close properly, the court hereby
\ rules that plaintiff's recovery against defendant Century
I 21 is limited to the value of its actual services rendered, not
^ i n c l u d i n g its actions taken after disbursement of escrow funds.
3.

Crossclaim defendant Casper's Motion for Summary Judgment

against Crossclaim plaintiff Century 21's claim for a broker's fee
is granted.

It appears to the court that Century 21 is not entitled

to a broker's fee in light of the fraudulent circumstances under
which the buyer, defendant Bontivia, entered the escrow agreement.

PAGE THREE
# 69,561
Accordingly, the Motions for Summary Judgment of plaintiff and
defendant Casper are granted in part and denied in part as per the
above Ruling.

All parties are to bear their own costs.

Issues

of defendant Casper's alleged damages and plaintiff's entitlement
to an escrow fee will be heard on application by any party hereto
and proper notice being given.

Dated this ^Z

day of

/j?o^£>

1986.

DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:

Anron F. Jepson
Robert L. Moody
Michael J. Petro
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OCT 2-: 1986
Robert L. Moody, #2302
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
55 East Center Street
P.O. Box 1466
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone 801-373-2721
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH (RUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 69,561

DICK CASPER, CARLO BONTIVIA
and CENTURTY 21 GOLDEN VvEST
INC.,
Defendants.

The above e n t i t l e d m a t t e r having come on r e g u l a r l y
hearing

before

t h e Court on P l a i n t i f f ' s

Motion

for

for

Summary

Judgment and t h e Court h a v i n g made i t s R u l i n g pursuant t o Rule
2 . 8 and b e i n g f u l l y a d v i s e d in the p r e m i s e s ;
NOw HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as
1.

Plaintiff

follows:

i s hereby awarded judgment a g a i n s t

the

Defendant Dick Casper in t h e sum of FORTY THOUSAND ( $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 )
DOLLARS t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e o f 10% from t h e 22nd
day

of

March,

1985

to

the

date

1

of

this

judgment

and

12%

therafter until paid.
2.

Defendant Casper shall have the right to present

evidence with regard to any detriment he may have suffered in
using the funds to pay his various creditors.
3.

Plaintiff f s

cause

of

action

with

regard

to

indemnification is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
4.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against the

Defendant Century 21 Golden Uest Inc. in the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND ($5,000.00) DOLLARS together with

interest

at the

rate of 10% from the 22nd day of March, 1985 to the date of
this judgment and 12% thereafter.
5.i

Plaintiffs claim with regard to indemnity against

Defendant Century 21 Golden hest Inc. is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
6.

The cross-claim

of Century 21 Golden Vjest Inc.

against the Defendant Dick Casper for brokerage fee is hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
7.

Each of the parties is hereby ordered to pay their

own costs.
8.

Further issues will be heard upon application and

proper notice.

2

DATED this

, 1986.

day of

BOYD L. PARK
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Arron F. Jeppson, Esq., 8
East 300 South Judge Building, Suite 510, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 and Mr. Michael J. Petro, Esq., P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah
84603; postage prepaid this pjb'

day of

(<l\

1986.

rtuMlJjU

T
J
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Robert L. Moody, #2302
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
55 East Center Street
P.O. Box 1466
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone 801-373-2721
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SECURITY TITLE & ABSTRACT
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
DICK CASPER, CARLO BONTIVIA,
and CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST,
INC.,

Civil No. 69,561

Defendants.
The above e n t i t l e d
hearing

before

the

Court

m a t t e r having come on r e g u l a r l y
on P l a i n t i f f ' s

J u d g m e n t . The Court h a v i n g made a r u l i n g

Motion
bearing

for

for

Summary

the date

of

March 3 1 , 1986 and a proposed Judgment was s u b m i t t e d pursuant t o
said

Ruling

dated

March

31,

1986,

but

proposed Summary Judgment having been f i l e d

objections
with

to

said

the Court.

h e a r i n g was h e l d for t h e above e n t i t l e d Court on s a i d

A

objections

and proposed Summary Judgment on February 20, 1987 at which t i m e
P l a i n t i f f a p p e a r e d i n p e r s o n and by and t h r o u g h t h e i r

1

counsel,

Thomas S. Taylor; Defendant

Capser appeared

through his

attorney, Michael J. Petro; Defendant Century 21 Golden West,
Inc., appeared through their counsel, Arron F. Jepson; and no
one appearing for and on behalf of Defendant Bontivia.
Court having heard

The

the arguments of counsel, a review and

examination of the facts having been made and the Court being
fully advised, made and has entered an Amended Ruling of the
Court.

Pursuant to said Amended Ruling, on file herein, the

Court
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES a s
1•
Defendant

Plaintiff
Dick C a s p e r

is

hereby

and

t h e 22nd d a y of M a r c h ,
twelve

percent

Judgment

against

i n t h e sum of FORTY THOUSAND ( $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 )

DOLLARS, t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t
from

awarded

follows:

a t t h e r a t e of t e n p e r c e n t (10%)

1 9 8 5 t o t h e d a t e of t h i s

(12%) t h e r e a f t e r

until

paid.

Judgment
Defendant

Casper i s hereby ordered not to encuaiber, s a l e or t r a n s f e r
r e a l p r o p e r t y he p u r p o r t e d l y s o l d t o D e f e n d a n t B o n t i v i a
the

final

n e t judgment

herein

described,

after

the set-off

b e e n d e t e r m i n e d a n d r u l e d u p o n . The r e a l p r o p e r t y
being described as

in

the

until
has

question

follows:

Lot 1 8 , P l a t "A", H o l i d a y H i l l s P l a n n e d D w e l l i n g
Group, Utah C o u n t y , S t a t e of U t a h , a c c o r d i n g t o
t h e o f f i c i a l p l a t t h e r e o f on f i l e i n t h e o f f i c e
of t h e R e c o r d e r of Utah C o u n t y , S t a t e of U t a h .
2.

Defendant

Casper

shall
2

submit

to

Plaintiff

any

e v i d e n c e t h a t he may have w i t h r e g a r d t o h i s c l a i m e d

set-off

r e l a t i n g t o h i s damages c l a i m e d and r e l a t e d t o t h e payment of
h i s v a r i o u s c r e d i t o r s from the funds he r e c e i v e d w i t h i n

sixty

(60) d a y s from t h e e n t r y h e r e o f .

In t h e e v e n t t h e p a r t i e s do

not

said

stipulate

and a g r e e

as

to

amount,

appropriate

Memorandums and Evidence s h a l l be submitted in w r i t t e n form to
t h i s Court t o be r u l e d upon p u r s u a n t to Rule 2.8.

At t h a t time

the Court s h a l l d e t e r m i n e what i f any amount Defendant

Casper

i s e n t i t l e d to as a c r e d i t upon the FORTY THOUSAND (540,000.00)
DOLLAR judgment awarded P l a i n t i f f
as h e r e i n

described.

In t h e e v e n t

submit evidence to P l a i n t i f f
hereof,

Plaintiff

a g a i n s t Defendant Casper and

shall

the Defendant

fails

w i t h i n s i x t y (60) days from

be

entitled

to

execution

to

entry

on

its

judgment.
3.
Casper,

By reason of P l a i n t i f f ' s
Plaintiff's

cause

of

Judgment a g a i n s t
action

with

Defendant

regard

to

i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t Casper i s h e r e b y d i s m i s s e d
with p r e j u d i c e .
4.

Plaintiff

is

hereby

awarded

Judgment

against

Defendant C e n t u r y 21 Golden West, I n c . , in t h e amount of FIVE
THOUSAND ( $ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) DOLLARS.

Plaintiff

i s h e r e b y s t a y e d from

e x e c u t i n g upon t h i s judgment u n t i l February 20,

1988, a t which

time t h i s s t a y a g a i n s t execution s h a l l be removed.
3

Plaintiff

is

noc

entitled

to

DOLLAR j u d g m e n t

interest
herein

on s a i d

described

FIVE THOUSAND

($5,000.00)

and no i n t e r e s t

shall

a t t a c h e d t h e r e t o u n t i l February 28, 1988, a t which t i m e

be

interest

s h a l l commence upon s a i d judgment a t the r a t e of t w e l v e p e r c e n t
(12%) per annum.
5.

P l a i n t i f f ' s claim with regard to indemnify

against

Defendant Century 21 Golden West, I n c . , i s hereby d i s m i s s e d w i t h
prejudice.
6.
against

The C r o s s - c l a i m

Defendant

of C e n t u r y 21 Golden West,

Dick C a s p e r

for

brokerage

fees

is

Inc.,
hereby

dismissed with p r e j u d i c e .
7.

Each of t h e p a r t i e s i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d t o pay t h e i r

own c o s t s , fees and e x p e n s e s .
8.

F u r t h e r i s s u e s w i l l be h e a r d upon a p p l i c a t i o n

and

proper n o t i c e .
*- >

Li

DATED this

/

//!J

day of

/

.' r(

N

, 1987.

K/

__

B0YD"Lr"PARK7"DlSTRICf"JUDGE""

»

I

4

CERIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

JZJJ^AJ

day of February,

1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, postage prepaid to the following:
Arron F. Jepson
8 East 300 South
Judge Building, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael J. Petro
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
••••••••A*

CASE NUMBER: CV 88-416

CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC.,
Plaintiff,

RULING
SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT
COMPANY,
Defendant.
**********

This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion to
Dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Both parties have filed memorandum
of points and authorities in support of their positions. In
addition, plaintiff hasklso filed a motion for summary judgment.
The court having carefully considered the motions and the
accompanying memo now enters its:
RULJNG
The present action arises from a prior action between
the present parties. In that action, assigned to Judge Sam,
plaintiff here was the defendant and the defendant here was the
plaintiff.

Plaintiff there filed a motion for summary judgment

which was reviewed and considered by judge Sam. A ruling was then
diafted; however, before judge Sam siqned the ruling, he left to
take up a federal judgeship with the federal district court.
Judge Park, Sam's successor then signed judge Sam's ruling.
Objections were made to the ruling, and after oral arguments,

judge Park rendered an ammended ruling; pursuant to that ruling a
judgment was entered. Plaintiff here did not appeal, instead it
filed a new action for relief from the

judgment entered by judge

Park. The gist of plaintiff's action here is that judge Park's
order amending judge Sam's prior ruling

is null and void, and

has no effect,because judge Park was without authority to amend
judge Sam's prior ruling.
Defendant's motion to dismiss is based on the grounds
that the prior action between the two parties is res judicata as
to the present action, and plaintiff's appropriate remedy is an
appeal? not the commencement of a new action.
Addressing these two grounds, Rule 60 of the rules of
civil procedure provides that the procedure for obtaining relief
form a judgment shall be by motion or by an independent action.
Therefore the rule permits the filing of an independent action.
However a question arises as to the scope of using independent
actions to obtain relief from a judgment, it appears that
plaintiff takes the position that an independent action may be
used to challenge any judgments. However, Utah case law and
federal case law interpreting Rule 60 seem to indicate that
independent actions may only be used to challenge certain
judgments.
The cases that have allowed a party to file an
independent action are cases where the judgments were procured by

fraud. In the Utah case of Despain v. Despain, 682 P.2d 849 (Utah
]9R4), the court allowed an independent action to be filed on the
ground of fraud. Jjji. at 452-453. In Bankers Mortg. Co. v. U. S.f
423 F.2d 73 (C.A. Tex. 1970), cert, denied, 90 S.Ct. 2242 (1970),
the court enunciated the elements of the independent action.
These are the elements: (1) a judgment which ought not,
in equity and good conscience, be enforced; (2) a good defense to
the alleged cause of action on which the judgment is founded; (3)
fraud, accident or mistake which prevented the defendant from
obtaining the benefit of his defense; (4) the absence of fault or
negLigence on the part of defendant; and (5) the absence of any
adequate remedy at Jaw. [n affirming the district court's
dismissal of the independent action, the court of appeal held
M

in the instant case taxpayer never intimates that mistake,

accident or fraud prevented its presentation of a meritorious
defense in the original

proceeding. Similarly, we are totally

unable to understand why equitable considerations require that
the effect of the judgment be compromised." !_d.
Here, plaintiff has not alleged any of the equitable
grounds required for maintaining an independent action. Second,
an independent action may be maintained only if there Ls no
adequate remedy at law. Here, the remedy of appeal was available
t<~> plaintiff, and it had ample time to file an appeal. It chose
n<>t to exercise that right. Since an independent action is in

equity, it should be granted only if equitable considerations
require that the prior judgment be vacated. Plaintiff here has
not shown any equitable considerations to justify filing this
independent action to obtain relief form the prior judgment.
Based

on the foregoing analysis the defendant's motion

to Dismiss is hereby granted, and plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment is denied.
DATED, in Provo, Utah this /<7 day of July, 1988.

GEORGE ~£L

BALLIFT"

JUDGfe.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

2

ic ic -k

3
4
5
6 SECURITY TITLE AND
A3 5 TPui T T C DtiPjJsY

7
Plaintiff,

8

)

9
10

Civil No. 69,561
HEARING TRANSCRIPT

vs

)

II
12 DICK CASPER ET AL
13

)

Defendants

14
15
16 I

BE IT REMEMBERED that on Friday the 20th day of

17 | February, 1987, the HEARING in the above entitled matter
18 |was taken by Richard C. Tatton, a Certified Shorthand
)9 I Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah
20 before the Honorable Boyd L. Park at the Utah County Courthou pe
21

Provo, Utah 84601

A P P E A R A N C E S

For the Plaintiff:

Mr. Tom Taylor
Attorney at Law
Provo, Utah 84601

8 I For the Defendant
Century 21 Golden
9 ]West Inc.:

Mr. Aaron Jepson
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake City, Utah

10 |
11
12
13 (For the Defendant
Dick Casper:
14
15

Mr. Mike Petro
Attorney at Law
Provo, Utah

16

P R O C E E D I N G S

17
18

THE COURT:

Okay we are here this morning on

19 Security Title and Abstract Company plaintiff vs. Dick
20 Casper Et Al, defendants

and there were some cross claims

21 or whatever this is something that became before Judge
22 Sam.

Judge Sam had actually written the ruling in this

23 matter but he had not signed it before he was elevated to
24 the Federal Bench.
25 Judgment

I reviewed the file, reviewed his

and I felt that it was fair under the circumstances

1

THE COURT:

I understand what you are saying. I

2 think this is why Judge Sam did what he did.
j

MR. JEPSON: Right.

4

THE COURT:

And I simply just signed his Judgment

5 for him since he was gone and he had already rendered it.
6

I don t think I believe Judge S am.

7 by the rules of evidence

I think I am more bound

and the rules

of law construction

8 I just can't reach out here and - 9

MR. JEPSON:

But the claim here is in an equitable

10 setting and certainly equity can say

we have two victims

11 and they were both defrauded by the same chain of events
12 we will make the one victim make the second victim whole.
13 That certainly cannot be equitable.
14

THE COURT:

Yes I can maybe not in the opinion

15 of your client may not be equitable but I think your
16 client

may have some remedy with the $5,000.00 against

17 the bank and maybe against Mr. Bontivia.
18 I

MR. JEPSON:

If the court were to find to amend the

19 previous ruling and I am hoping and urging that you don't
20 do that but if you do then what I would suggest and this
21 may be an unusual approach but I would suggest that if you
22 were inclined to enter any kind of a Judgment whether it is
23 for the $5,000.00 or some lesser amount, would it be
24 possible to enter the Judgment with the payment liability
25 or enter an order that

he is responsible to reimburse Securi FY

27

TabF
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ARRON F. JEPSON, #1698
Attorney for Century 21 Golden West, Inc.
No. 8 East 300 South
Judge Building, No. 608
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2202
Telephone: (801) 364-9100
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOOoo
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. CV-88-416

SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT
COMPANY,
Defendant.
oooOOoo

COMES NOW the plaintiff, CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., (hereafter
called "Century 21", or "plaintiff"), by and through its attorney, ARRON F.
JEPSON, and for causes of action against the defendant alleges as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah corporation with its principal place of

business in Utah County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant is a title and abstract company doing business in

Utah County.
3.

Venue is proper in Utah County.

4.

On or about May 10, 1985, a civil action was filed in the

Fourth Judicial District Court under Civil No. 69561, in which the
defendant was the plaintiff and in which the plaintiff herein was named
as a co-defendant.

In that action and after the filing of the Complaint,

a motion for summary judgment was filed by SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT
COMPANY, on or about August 29, 1985.

(This previous action, No. 69561,

shall hereafter be called or referred to as, "previous action", or
"original action")•
5.

After the submission of all pleadings and replies with regard

to SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY'S (hereafter called "Security Title")
motion for summary judgment, Judge Sam, the then judge assigned to the case,
examined all of the evidence and the pleadings and drafted a minute entry
in that original action dated Marfch 31, 1986.
6.

Prior to the execution of the minute entry ruling on Security

Title's summary judgment motion in the original action, Judge Sam left
the State bench and assumed new responsibilities as a Judge on the
Federal bench in Salt Lake City.

Judge Sam never signed the minute entry

ruling (hereafter called, "Judge Sam's ruling or order"), which he had
prepared after reviewing the evidence submitted in support and in opposition
of Security Title's summary judgment motion.
7.

Judge Boyd Park assumed the State Court bench in place

of Judge Sam, und thereafter signed Judge Sam's ruling or order and placed
his name thereon under date of March 3X» 1986.
H.

In paragraph 2 of Judge Sam's order, the Court ruled as

follows regarding Century 21:
However, upon consideration of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the failure of escrow
to close properly, the Court hereby rules that plaintiff's
recovery against defendant Century 21 is limited to the
value of its actual services rendered, not including its
actions taken after disbursement of escrow funds.

-2-

9.

Judge Sam's ruling was an effective, entered order of the

Court, pursuant to Rule 7(b)(2), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states:
An order includes every direction of the court
including a minute order made and entered in
writing and not included in a judgment.
10.

On October 22, 1986, a copy of a proposed summary judgment

prepared by Security Title's attorney, ROBERT MOODY, was received in
Century 21 counsel's office in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Century 21, through

its counsel, filed objections to Security Title's proposed judgment because
paragraph 4 of said proposed judgment was just the opposite of Judge Sam's
ruling.
11.

The matter was set for oral argument by the Court on February 20,

1987, at 11:00 a.m., before the Honorable Boyd L. Park.

Mr. Thomas Taylor

appeared in behalf of Robert Moody for Security Title, and Arron F. Jepson
appeared in behalf of Century 21. There was no new evidence presented
to the Court at this 1987 hearing.

Judge Park indicated (and the plaintiff

herein believes that such is on a court record which can be transcribed
hereafter) that the Court (meaning Judge Park), had assumed the bench
after Judge Sam's ruling had been prepared, and simply executed the ruling
and entered it in the record.

The Court (meaning Judge Park), at the

February 20, 1987 hearing, after hearing arguments of counsel, but without
either viewing the evidence or receiving any new or contrary evidence,
reversed the ruling prepared by Judge Sam which he himself (Judge Park)
had signed, and ordered that judgment enter against Century 21 and in

-3-

favor of Security Title in the amount of $5,000.00.
12.

Judge Park signed and entered a Summary Judgment prepared by

Security Title's attorney, Robert Moody,i which judgment was signed and entered
in the Register of Actions on March 4, 1987.
13.

There is no minute entry or order in the Court vacating the

previous order.

There now exist

two (2) contradictory judgments or orders of

the court with respect to the liability of Century 21 toward Security Title.
14.

Century 21 alleges that it is entitled to relief from the

second judgment entitled, "Summary Judgment" entered on or about March 4, 1987,
under the signature of Judge Park, and is entitled to the legal effect and
consequences of Judge Sam's earlier ruling and order on the summary judgment
motion of Security Title.

Furthermore, plaintiff herein, (Century 21), alleges

that the second order of Judge Park was illegally entered (meaning contrary
to law) and is null and void and of no effect and is entitled to judgment in
this action in accordance therewith.
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant as
follows:
1.

For an order or judgment of this court relieving the plaintiff

from the effects of the March 4, 1987 "Summary Judgment" entered under the
signature of Judge Park.
2.

For reinstatement or reaffirmation of the judgment or ruling of

Judge Sam as contained in the March 31, 1986 minute entry prepared by Judge Sam
and executed by Judge Boyd Park.
3.

For such other and further relief, including equitable relief, as
-4-

is just in the premises.

DATED this

/S~

day of March,

J988,

CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., a Utah
corporation

VSf-.( \-\\Y>„, r^^-r* *~V\

BY:

MARK HA^HAWA'Y, P r e s i d e n t

ARRON F . JEPSON
Attorney for Plafjrtfiff
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

) ss.
)

MARK HATHAWAY, as president of CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC.,
being duly sworn deposes and says:
That he is the president of the above-named corporation which is
the plaintiff in the above-entitled action; that he has read the foregoing
Complaint and knows the contents thereof; that the same are true of his
own knowledge, except as to those matters that are therein stated on his
information or belief, and, as to those matters, he believes them to be
true.
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC.

BY:\\

X-VN

l

Ac*

^/v. (X-

^-^>S^~-\

MARK
HATHAWAY, President'
RKH

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this //'>-

,L< OS

v

Residing at: J'

*7

s

— k ( 0- 'h .

NOTARY PUBLIC ,

My Commissi on Expires:

day of March, 1988.

a.
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TIME LINE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

May 10, 1985

Complaint filed

1st Action # 69561

August 29, 1985

Security Title filed Summary
Judgment Motion asking for $5,000
judgment against Century 21

Prior to
March 31, 1986

Minute Entry Ruling prepared by
Trial Judge David Sam denying
$5,000 judgment against Century 21

March, 1986

Judge Park appointed as Successor
Judge to replace vacancy left by
Judge Sam

March 31, 1986

Judge Park signed and entered Judge
Sam's Minute Entry Ruling

October 22, 1986

Proposed Summary Judgment prepared
and delivered by Security Title's
attorney to Century 21fs attorney
Objection to Proposed Summary
Judgment filed

February 20, 1987

Hearing on Century 21fs Objection
to Proposed Summary Judgment set
and held

March 4, 1987

New judgment entered for $5,000
(opposite of Judge Sam's Ruling
denying the $5,000)

March 3, 1988

New action for relief from Judgment
filed by Century 21 CV. 88416

TabH

PART I
Scope of Rules—One Form of Action
Rule 1.

Genera! Provisions

(a) Scope of Rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in
the Supreme Court, the districts courts, city courts, and justice
courts of the state of Utah, in all actions, suits and proceedings
of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in
all special statutory proceedings, except as stated in Rule 81.
They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.
(b) Effective Date. These rules shall take effect on January 1,
1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no
further force or effect. They govern all proceedings in actions
brought after they take effect and also all further proceedings in
actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of
the court their application in a particular action pending when
the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies.

Rule 2.

One Form of Action

There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action."

1

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56- and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
'
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later t h a n 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact a n d c o n c l u s i o n s of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended, effective J a n . 1, 1987.)

Rule 60

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

tions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.

Amendment, after expiration of time for fij.
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Court reporter's death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Key Number*. — New Trial *=» 13 et aeq
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order,
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the perdency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is patterned
after, and similar to, Rule 60, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
to set aside judgment, § 2X-2-2.
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Rule 63

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Injunctive relief pending appeal.
Motion for injunction to restrain dissipation
of marital assets during the pendency of the
appeal of the divorce action should be filed
with the district court; any jurisdiction that
the Supreme Court may have in such matters
should be invoked only after a party has
sought relief in the district court, in all but the
most exceptional circumstances. Warren v.
Warren, 642 P.2d 385 (Utah 1982).
Stay to prevent injustice.
Equitable relief from the enforcement of a
judgment is not granted on the ground that the
parties have cross demands, merely, but rather
that some injustice would result were execution not stayed. Palmquist v. Palmquist, 6
Utah 2d 294, 312 P.2d 779 (1957).
Where there was a judgment against husband under a divorce decree, it was improper to

enter a stay of execution in order to give hu
band an opportunity to start an action ngair*
wife which was based on an independent trarv
action between the parties, and where th?i
was no showing that some injustice to the hut
band would otherwise result. Palmcuist t
Palmquist, 6 Utah 2d 294, 312 P.2d 779 < 195;
Temporary nature of stay.
A court granting a judgment, in its disci*
tion, may temporarily stay execution in ordtto prevent injustice, but it may not negate >•>
own judgment by indefinitely staying exertion thereon. Taylor Nat'l, Inc. v. Jensen Brw
Constr, Co., 641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982X
Cited in Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bree*
Co., 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40 (1972
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987
Jensen v. Schwendiman, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 4J
(Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions view, judgment or order revoking or suspend
§§ 42, 692 to 710; 46 Am. Jur. 2d 1031 to 1043, ing professional, trade, or occupational licen*
Judgments §§ 897 to 914.
42 A.L.R.4th 516.
C.J.S. — 33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 66, 139 to
Constitutionality, construction, and applies,
164; 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 585 to 591.
tton of statute as to effect of taking appeal, Q.
A.L.R. — Appealability of order staying, or staying execution, on right to redeem from ext
refusing to stay, action because of pendency of culion or judicial sale, 44 A.L.R.4th 1229.
another action, 18 A.L.R.3d 400.
Key Numbers. — Execution «» 75, 158 t
Validity and construction of state statutory 177; Judgment «=» 851 to 856.
provision forbidding court to stay, pending re-

Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge.
(a) Disability. If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge
before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be
performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly
sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform
those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those
duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may
in his discretion grant a new trial.
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil
or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the judge
before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite
party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in
another judge to hear and determine the matter.
Every such affidavit shall state tho facts and the reasons for the belief that
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known. If the judge against
whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to
another judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction,
206
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material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The
facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with
particularity to those portions of the record upon which movant relies.
(e) The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each
fact in dispute shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the
opposing parry relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered
sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material
facts set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
the statement of the opposing party.
(f) Decision shall be rendered without a hearing unless requested by
the court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and time for such
hearing.
(g) In all cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the
action or any issues thereof on the merits with prejudice, the party
resisting the motion may request a hearing and such request shall be
granted unless the motion is summarily denied. If no such request is
made within ten (10) days of Notice to Submit for decision, a hearing on
the motion shall be deemed waived.
(h) Provided, however, that any district court and any circuit court bv
order of the judge or judges of the court may exclude that court from the
operation of this Rule 2.8 in which case an alternative procedure shall be
prescribed by written administrative order or rule.
Rule 2.9 Written Orders, Judgments, and Decrees
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining
the ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter time as the court
may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in
conformity with the ruling.
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Orders shall
be served on opposing counsel before being presented to the court for
signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto
shall be submitted to the court and counsel within (5) days after service.
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the
settlement and dismissal.

-61983 Replacement

Rule 59
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Cas. 1912D, 588 (sustaining and recommending the practice and citing federal cases and cases in accord from
about sixteen states and contra from three States). The
procedure in several States provides specifically for partial
new trials. Ariz.Rev.Code Ann., Struckmeyer, 1928,
§ 3852; Calif.Code Civ.Proc., Deering, 1937, §§ 657, 662;
Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats., 1937, c. 110, § 216 (Par. (f)); Md.
Ann.Code, Bagby, 1924, Art. 5, §§ 25, 26; Mich.Court
Rules Ann., Searl, 1933, Rule 47, § 2; Miss.Sup.Ct.Rule 12,
161 Miss. 903, 905, 1931; N.J.Sup.Ct.Rules 131, 132, 147, 2
NJ.Misc. 1197, 1246-1251, 1255, 1924; 2 N.D.Comp.Laws
Ann., 1913, § 7844, as amended by N.D.Laws 1927, ch. 214.
1946 AMENDMENT
Note to Subdivision (b). With the time for appeal to a
circuit court of appeals reduced in general to 30 days by
the proposed amendment of Rule 73(a), the utility of the
original "except" clause, which permits a motion for a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence to be
made before the expiration of the time for apj>eal, would
have been seriously restricted. It was thought advisable,
therefore, to take care of this matter in another way. By
amendment of Rule 60(b), newly discovered evidence is
made the basis for relief from a judgment, and the maximum time limit has been extended to one year. Accordingly the amendment of Rule 59(b) eliminates the "except" clause and its specific treatment of newly discovered
evidence as a ground for a motion for new trial. This
ground remains, however, as a basis for a motion for new
trial served not later than 10 days after the entry of
judgment. See also Rule 60(b).
As to the effect of a motion under subdivision (b) upon
the running of appeal time, see amended Rule 73(a) ami
Note.
Subdivision (e). This subdivision has been added to
care for a situation such as that arising in Boaz v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of New York, C.C.A.8,1944,146 F.2d 321, and
makes clear that the district court possesses the power
asserted in that case to alter or amend a judgment after
its entry. The subdivision deals only with alteration or
amendment of the original judgment in a case and does
not relate to a judgment upon motion as provided in Rule
50(b). As to the effect of a motion under subdivision (e)
upon the running of appeal time, see amended Rule 73(a)
and Note.
The title of Rule 59 has been expanded to indicate the
inclusion of this subdivision.
1966 AMENDMENT
By narrow interpretation of Rule 59(b) and (d), it has
been held that the trial court is without power to grant a
motion for a new trial, timely served, by an order made
more than 10 days after the entry of judgment, based
upon a ground not stated in the motion but perceived and
relied on by the trial court sua sponte. Freid v. McGrath,
133 F.2d 350 (D.C.Cir.1942); National Farmers Union
Auto. & Cas. Co. v. Wood, 207 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1953);
Bailey v. Slentz, 189 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1951); Marshall's
U. S. Auto Supply, Inc. v. Cashman, 111 F.2d 140 (10th Cir.
1940), cert, denied, 311 U.S. 667 (1940); but see Steinberg
v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 36 F.R.D. 253 (E.D.La.1964).
The result is undesirable. Just as the court has power
under Rule 59(d) to grant a new trial of its own initiative
within the 10 days, so it should have power, when an
Complete Annotation Mai

effective new trial motion has been made and is pending,
to dwide it on grounds thought meritorious by the court
although not advanced in the motion. The second sentence added by amendment to Rule 59(d) confirms the
court's power in the latter situation, with provision that
the parties be afforded a hearing before the power is
exercised. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice, par. 59.09[2]
(2d e i 1953).
In considering whether a given ground has or has not
been advanced in the motion made by the party, it should
be borne in mind that the particularity called for in
stating the grounds for a new trial motion is the same as
that required for all motions by Rule 7(b)(1). The latter
rule does not require ritualistic detail but rather a fair
indication to court and counsel of the substance of the
grounds relied on. See Lebeck v. William A. Jarvis Co.,
250 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1957); Tsai v. Rosenthal, J)7 F.2d
614 (8th Cir. 1961); Genera/ Motors Corp. v. Perry, 303
F.2d [44 (7th Cir. 1962); cf. Grimm v. California SpravChemical Corp., 264 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1959); Cooper V.
Midwest Feed Products Co., 271 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1959).
R u l e 6 0 . Relief from Judgment or Order
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own
initiative or on the motion of any party and after
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is ponding may be so corrected with leave of the appellate
court.
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2),
and (3) not more than one year after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit the power of a court to
tals, See Title 28 U.S.C.A.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judhTnent, order, or proceeding, or to grant
relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs
of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and
bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of
review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.
(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Dec. 29,
1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949.)
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES
Note to Subdivision (a). See former Equity Rule 72
(Correction of Clerical Mistakes in Orders and Decrees);
Mich. Court Rules Ann. (Searl, 1933) Rule 48, § 3; 2
Wash.Rev.Stat.Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 464(3); Wyo.
Rev.SUt.Arm., (Courtnght, 1931) § 89-2301(3). For an
example of a very liberal provision for the correction of
clerical errors and for amendment after judgment, vjee
Va.Code Arm. (Michie, 1936) §§ 6329, 6333.
Note to Subdivision (b). Application to the court under
this subdivision does not extend the time for taking an
appeal, as distinguished from the motion for new trial.
This section is based upon Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering,
1937) § 473. See also N.Y.C.P.A., 1937, § 108; 2 Minn.
Stat., Mason, 1927, § 9283.
For the independent action to relieve against mistake,
etc. see Dobie, Federal Procedure, pages 760-765, compare
639; and Simkins, Federal Practice, ch. CXXI, pp. 820830, and ch. CXXII, pp. 831-834, compare § 214.
1946 AMENDMENT
Note to Subdivision (a). The amendment incorporates
the view expressed in Perlman v. 322 West SeventySecond Street Co., Inc., C.C.A.2, 1942, 127 F.2d 716; 3
Moore's Federal Practice, 1938, 3276, and further permits
correction after docketing, with leave of the appellate
court. Some courts have thought that upon the taking of
an appeal the district court lost its power to act. See
Schram v. Safety Investment Co., Mich.1942, 45 F.Supp.
636; also Miller v. United States, C.C.A.7, 1940, 114 F.2d
267.
Note to Subdivision (b). When promulgated, the rules
contained a number of provisions, including those found in
Rule 60(b), describing the practice by a motion to obtain
relief from judgments, and these rules, coupled with the,
reservation in Rule 60(b) of the right to entertain a new
action to relieve a party from a"judgment, were generally
supposed to cover the field. Since the rule's have been in
force, decisions have l>een rendered that the use of bills of
review, coram nobis, or audita querela, to obtain relief
from final judgments is still proper, and that various
remedies of this kind still exist although they are not
mentioned in the rules and the practice is not prescribed n
the rules. It is obvious that the rules should be complete
in this respect and define the practice with respect to any
existing rights or remedies to obtain relief from final
judgments. For extended discussion of the old common
law writs and equitable remedies, the interpretation of
Rule 60, and proposals for change, see Moore and Rogei*s,

Rule 60

Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 1946, 55 Yale L.J.
623. See also 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 1938, 3254 et
seq.; Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods
of Relief From Judgment, 1941, 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 942,
f>45; Wallace v. United States, C.C.A.2, 1944,142 F.2d 240,
certiorari denied 65 S.Ct. 37, 323 U.S. 712, 89 L.Ed. 573.
The reconstruction of Rule 60(b) has for one of its
purposes a clarification of this situation. Two types of
procedure to obtain relief from judgments are specified in
the rules as it is proposed to amend them. One procedure
is by motion in tne court and in the action in which the
judgment was rendered. The other procedure is by a new
or independent action to obtain relief from a judgment,
which action may or may not be begun in the court which
rendered the judgment. Various rules, such as the one
dealing with a motion for new trial and for amendment of
judgments, Rule 59, one for amended findings, Rule 52,
and one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Rule
50(b), and including the provisions of Rule 60(b) as amended, prescribe the various types of cases in which the
practice by motion is permitted. In each case there is a
limit upon the time within which resort to a motion is
permitted, and this time limit may not be enlarged under
Rule 6(b). If the right to make a motion is lost by the :
expiration oFtTie time limits fixed in these rules, the only
other procedural re medy is by anew or independent action
io set aside a lulfemenl upon those principles which haye
heretofore been applied in such an action. Where the i
inde[>endent actun is resorted to, the limitations of time
are those of laches or statutes of limitations. The Committee, has endeavored to ascertain all the remedies and
types of relief heretofore available by coram nobis, coram
vobis, audita querela, bill of review, or bill in the nature of
a bill of review. See Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief
from Civil Judgments, 1946, 55 Yale L.J. 623, 659-682. J t .
endeavored then to amend the rules to permit, either by
"motion or by independent action, the granting of various
Rinds of relief from judgments which were permitted in
"thefederal courts prior to the adoption ot these rules, a!hd
the"amendmenCconcludes with a provision abolishing the
use of bills of revlew and the other common law wr!ts
referred to, and requiring the practice to be by motion or
by independent action.
To Illustrate the operation of the amendment, it will be
noted that under Rule 59(b) as it now stands, without
amendment, a motion for new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence is permitted within ten days
after the entry of the judgment, or after that time upon
leave of the court. It is proposed to amend Rule 59(b) by
providing that under that rule a motion for new trial shall
be served not later than ten days after the entry of the
judgment, whatever the ground be for the motion, whether error by the court or newly discovered evidence. On
the other hand, one of the purposes of the bill of review in
equity was to afford relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence long after the entry of the judgment.
Therefore, to [>ermit relief by a motion similar to that
heretofore obtained on bill of review, Rule 60(b) as amended permits an application for relief to be made by motion,
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, within one
year after judgment. Such a motion under Rule 60(b)
does not affect the finality of the judgment, but a motion
under Rule 59, made within 10 days, does affect finality
and the running of the time for appeal.
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Rule 60

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

If these various amendments, including principally those
to Rule 60(b), accomplish the purpose for which they are
intended, the federal rules will deal with the practice in
every sort of case in which relief from final judgments is
asked, and prescribe the practice. With reference to the"T
question whether, as the rules now exist, relief by coram I
nobis, bills of teview, and so forth, is permissible, the j
generally accepted view is that the remedies are still!
available, although the precise relief obtained in a particu- j
lar case by use of these ancillary remedies is shrouded in J
ancient lore and mystery. See Wallace v. United States,
C.C.A.2, 1944, 142 F.2d 240, certiorari denied 65 S.Ct. 37,
323 U.S. 712, 89 L.Ed. 573; Fraser v. Doing, App.D.C.1942,
130 F.2d 617; Jones v. Tfatts, C.C.A.5, 1944, 142 F.2d 575;
Preveden v. Hahn, N.Y.1941, 36 F.Supp. 952; Cavallo v.
Agwilines, Inc., N.Y.1942, 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 2,
2 F.R.D. 526; McGinn v. United States, D.Mass.1942, 6
Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.51, Case 3, 2 F.R.D. 562; City of
Shattuck, Oklahoma ex rei Versluis v. Oliver, Okl.1945, 8
Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 3; Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 1946, 55 Yale L.J. 623,
631-653; 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 1938, 3254 et seq.;
Commentary Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods of
Relief from Judgments, op. cit. supra. Cf. Norris v. Camp,
C.C.A.10,1944, 144 F.2d 1; Reed v. South Atlantic Steamship Co. of Delaware, Del.1942, 2 F.R.D. 475, 6 Fed.Rules*
Serv. 60b.31, Case 1; Laughlin v. Berens, D.C.1945, 8*"
*Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.51, Case 1, 73 W.L.R. 209.
The transposition of the words "the court" and the
addition of the word "and" at the beginning of the first
sentence are merely verbal changes. The addition of the
qualifying word "final" emphasizes the character of the
judgments, orders or proceedings from which Rule 60(b)
affords relief; and hence interlocutory judgments are not
brought within the restrictions of the rule, but rather they
are left subject to the complete power of the court rendering them to afford such relief from them as justice re- *
quires.
The qualifying pronoun "his" has been eliminated on the
bas\s that it is too restrictive, and that the subdivision"
should include the mistake or neglect of others which may
be just as material and call just as much for supervisory
Jurisdiction as where the judgment is taken against the
party through his mistake, inadvertence, etc.
Fraud, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party are express
grounds for relief by motion under amended subdivision
(b). There is no sound reason for their exclusion. The
incorporation of fraud and the like within the scope of the
rule also removes confusion as to the proper procedure. It
has been held that relief from a judgment obtained by
extrinsic fraud could be secured by motion within a "reasonable time," which might be after the time stated in the
rule had run. Fiske v. Buder, C.C.A.8, 1942, 125 F.2d 841;
see also inferentially Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co.,
C.C.A.9, 1942, 125 F.2d 213. On the other hind, it has
been suggested that in view of the fact that fraud was
omitted from original Rule 60(b) as a ground fcr relief, an
independent action was the only proper remedy. Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods of Relief
From Judgment, 1941, 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 942, 945. The
amendment settles this problem by making fruid an express ground for relief by motion; and under the saving
clause, fraud may be urged as a basis for relief by inde-

pendent action insofar as established doctrine permits.
See Moore and Rogers Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 1946, 55 Yale LJ. 623, 65S-659; 3 Moore's Federal
Practice, 1938, 3267 et seq. And the rule expressly does
not limit the power of the court, when fraud ha,= been
perpetrated upon it, to give relief under the saving clause.
As an illustration of this situation, see Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 1944, 64 S.Ct. 997, 322 U.S.
238, 88 L.Ed. 1250.
The time limit for relief by motion in the court and in
the action in which the judgment was rendered ha^ been
enlarged from six months to one year
It should be noted that Rule 60(b) does not assume to
define substantive law as to the grounds for vacating
judgments, but merely prescribes the practice in proceedings to obtain relief. It should also be noted that under
§ 20(i(4) of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940, 50 U.S.C., Appendix, § 501 et seq. [§ 52TVU], a
judgment rendered in any action or proceeding governed
by the section may be vacated under certain ^prcified
circumstances upon proper application to the court
1948 AMENDMENT
The amendment effective October 1949, substituted the
reference to "Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655," in the next to the
last sentence of subdivision (b), for the reference tx» "Section 57 of the Judicial Code, U.S.C., Title 28, § 118."
R u l e 6 1 . Harmless Error
No error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties is ground for granting a new
trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating,
modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to
the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES
A combination of U.S.C., Title 28, § 2111, former § 391
(New trials; harmless error) and former § 777 (Defects of
form; amendments) with modifications See MrCandless
v. United States, 1936, 56 S.Ct. 764, 298 U.S. 342, 80 L Ed.
1205. Compare former Equity Rule 72 (Correction of
Clerical Mistakes in Orders and Decrees); and last sentence of former Equity Rule 46 (Trial—Testimony U dually
Taken in Open Court—Rulings on Objections to Evick nee). "*
For the last sentence see the last sentence of formersEquity Rule 19 (Amendments Generally)
Rule 62.

Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a
Judgment
(a) Automatic Stay; Exceptions—Injunctions,
Receiverships, and Patent Accountings. Except
as stated herein, no execution shall issue upon a
judgment nor shall proceedings be taken for its
enforcement until the expiration of 10 days aft'T its
entry Unless otherwise ordered by the cour:, an
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